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Saying that human dignity constitutes a problem may require explanation. It is in fact one 
of those things that we like to take for granted, and thus not to consider a problem. At the 
same time, paradoxically, we may be so sceptical about the possibility of bringing it into 
focus that we aren’t willing even to consider as amounting to a problem.  
 
Between these two extreme, but common, attitudes this article addresses the problem of 
identifying what human dignity is, what we mean by the expression and what we refer to 
when we intend what is meant by the expression. Discussions about this have often 
turned into a competition between different traditions and worldviews that provide 
incompatible ‘foundations’ for human dignity, a competition that seems to have to be 
‘won’ before a discussion of the nature of human dignity can begin. Such competition 
misses the point that we must mean something by the word for us to find it meaningful in 
order to fight about it. The ‘problem’ of human dignity consists in finding out what this 
is, and dealing with the problem thus serves to deflect attention away from the issue of 
conflicting worldviews towards the central theme around which they diverge, but on 
which they must converge for any discussion of human dignity to be meaningful. 
Concentrating on the problem in this manner implicitly directs itself towards its 
‘solution’, i.e. to finding out what it might be that different conceptualisations compete to 
conceptualise.  
 
In the following we shall first give a ‘satellite’ overview of what has been said about 
human dignity in the European tradition and discuss how to interpret the textual evidence 
(1). Then we shall suggest that human dignity could plausibly be said to be the 
fundamental value of the human being and show that representative accounts of the 
textual evidence converge on this idea (2). And finally we shall explain by a 
phenomenological analysis what it means that human dignity is the fundamental value of 
the human being (3). The background to this is my recent book On the Problem of 
Human Dignity, in which sources are discussed and arguments unfolded in much more 
detail.1 Here I shall attempt to present the argument in miniature. It goes without saying 
that there is more to say. 
 
 
1. What has been said about human dignity, and how are we to interpret it? 
 
Confronted with the task of identifying texts concerned with human dignity one is 
immediately faced with the problem of what human dignity is: if I don’t know what 
human dignity is, how will I know what texts are concerned with it? The only obvious 
answer to this conundrum seems to be to take texts to be about human dignity to the 
extent that they use the expression, or use linguistically related expressions. This 
procedure of starting with the use of words was also Aristotle’s; and we shall take his 
authority on this for lack of anything better. 
 
A survey of the resulting textual evidence sees the sources clustering historically and 
systematically according to four contexts: the classical, the Christian, the Modern and the 
contemporary. The contexts, in turn, reveal themselves as consisting of sets of 
presuppositions for mainstream thought, such that through them the social order relying 
on a state of technological development and reinforced by being represented by a 
conception of the social and natural order is reproduced and taken for granted as the way 
things are as long as the epoch lasts. 
 
Thus the Classical context with its focus on a cosmic order ties human dignity to nature, 
to human nature, i.e. to the extent that the idea has broken through in the classical period 
at all. Scant linguistic evidence can be found in Cicero, and evidence of the idea in 
Aristotle, although both are so determined by the need to reproduce the social context that 
they cannot imagine human nature to be equal in all. Thus the idea that human beings 
                                                 
1 Mette Lebech: On the Problem of Human Dignity. A Hermeneutical and Phenomenological Investigation, 
Königshausen und Neumann, Würzburg, 2009. 
possess dignity as such, although in principle present in classical times, is prevented from 
being thought out fully, and instead immediately covered up and accompanied by the idea 
that human nature comes, despite it being what makes human beings recognisable as 
such, as hierarchically stratified, with free Athenian men on the top, foreign slaves at the 
bottom and women in between. 
 
The Christian context inherits the idea of a hierarchically ordered universe in which the 
human being also tends to be regarded as dignified according to rank. But here the 
message of the Gospel reinforces the classical idea; the image of God is thought to refer 
to human beings specifically and generally. Thus the idea is slightly better focused in the 
anonymous treatise De dignitate conditionis humanae from around 800, in Robert 
Grosseteste and in Thomas Aquinas: although the social and legal consequences that 
already Cicero had seen as intrinsic to the idea of dignity are still left unconsidered. Some 
tendency exists, moreover, to identify human dignity with the dignity of the Christian, i.e. 
the dignity of the human being as redeemed by Christ through baptism. Jews and 
Muslims, thus, having not had their dignity restored by the death and resurrection of the 
Saviour, fall surreptitiously outside the social and legal order. 
 
At the same time as the Jews become indispensable for the mercantile expansion in 
Europe, cities foster a social organisation that gives new impetus to thinking about the 
status of the subject (of the ruler). The modern conception of human dignity is autonomy- 
state- or city centred, whether in Pico, where subjective responsibility for one’s own 
destiny is underlined, or in Kant who considers the dignity of the individual to rely on the 
ability to originate universal law. The problem with such a focus is that although 
explicitly universal, the link with nature, and thus with the biologically concrete human 
being, tends to get lost. The subject, when losing his status by sale, madness or treason 
likewise disappears as a human being, and thus the systematic formation of nation-states 
can take place by the displacement of peoples of the ‘wrong’ ethnic group, religion or 
political observation, powered by resources obtained from slave-labour and 
colonialisation. Human dignity, albeit perhaps directly focused in its abstract legal 
consequences, is thus detached from real human beings.  
 The idea is only discussed as a political instrument for obtaining equal rights, as the 
American and French Revolutions brings the thought within reach that government could 
be shared among the many. Wollstonecraft, arguing for the rights of both men and 
women, explicitly calls on the idea of a native dignity of the human being to justify social 
engineering by states and social groups alike. Thus is unleashed a process of political 
activity where the claiming of rights is organised by businesspeople, workers, women and 
slaves, in such a manner that the language of equal rights becomes universal. As the last 
of the European nations attempts to form one state by typically Modern means, the horror 
of the measures enlisted triggers war as never seen before. After this the world is ripe for 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with its preamble appealing to human 
dignity as the foundation of the new world order. The post-modern epoch thus is 
inaugurated. Now human dignity is regarded as prior to all ideologies and manners of 
thought, but its singular simplicity, implicitness and consequent resistance to 
conceptualisation still preserves it from full explanation. 
 
 
2. How context-representative accounts can converge on the idea that human dignity 
is the fundamental value of the human being. 
 
The different understandings of human dignity emerging from the various contexts 
identified are all live in the contemporary context in the sense that arguments will be 
made that human dignity requires a context, i.e. relies on a ‘foundation’, that is typical of 
either the classical, the Christian or the Modern context. The contemporary context, 
however, is explicitly wary of ‘foundations’, as it thrives on being inclusive of a plurality 
of explanatory contexts, and it adopts, paradoxically, but in fact, the idea of human 
dignity as the foundation for its own pluralistic, democratic stance, i.e. it forms part of the 
presuppositions of the epoch that cannot well be questioned without placing oneself 
outside the context. 
 
In what consists this ‘foundation’? What is human dignity to our context, apart from it 
being foundational to the idea of worldwide democracy and the reign of human rights? 
Inspired by Edith Stein’s phenomenological value theory in terms of which we shall later 
substantiate what is meant by human dignity, we can try out the hypothesis that it is the 
fundamental value of the human being. A value, according to this theory, is an ideal 
object (an essentiality) outside of time and space, concretely realised as founded on real 
objects. It is identified by that in which it inheres and by the level of depth of soul to 
which it corresponds, i.e. by the power with which it can in fact motivate. In itself it is 
thus a motivating power that can be known to us through the effect we let it have in our 
lives, whether as directly motivating us or as influencing the psyche in a manner detected 
in feelings. A value is on this account both a dependent object, i.e. dependent on the 
subject experiencing it, and also an independent object, in that it is experienced precisely 
as a source of motivating power for the subject. Because we must act, we must also chose 
between sources of motivating power that we allow to direct our actions by letting their 
power flow into our life-stream and determine its direction. Therefore we place our 
values in a hierarchy that can be read in our characters, and in the character of our 
communities which also are formed around the values that bring them together and power 
them for a common life. When we call a value ‘fundamental’ we mean that its motivating 
power is higher than that of all other values, that it underlies all these, and ought to be 
preferred to them. This could be because the other values are consequent upon this value, 
derive their importance from it and hence would not have the value they have were it not 
for this dependence. That human dignity is the fundamental value of the human being 
thus means, in Stein’s terms, that the value of the human being is highest and ought not to 
be preferred to any other value, the value in turn being an ideal object, an essentiality, of 
which we can form a concept that may express its essence. 
 
To form such a concept we would want to establish that this conception is not so 
dependent on our context that understandings rooted in other contexts cannot accept it. If 
they could not, in fact, it could not be what human dignity is, as the essentiality should be 
what identifies all conceptions of human dignity and thus provides the material for us to 
investigate its essence from occurrences of experiences experienced as being concerned 
with it.  
 
It is typical of each of the contexts identified that their epistemological presuppositions 
differ. Their understanding of what it is for a thing to be what it is, the various theories of 
essence predominant in them, are in fact often considered to be incompatible and the 
reason why a ‘foundation’ for human dignity must be accepted before discussion of its 
nature can begin. We must thus establish that it is possible for each of these diverging 
sets of epistemological presuppositions to conceive of human dignity in the manner 
proposed in order to say that no foundation for human dignity is needed beyond 
understanding it as the fundamental value of the human being in the manner proposed. 
 
Aristotle’s is possibly the most developed of the classical context’s theories of essence, 
even to the point of containing contradictory elements. Thus it is not quite clear whether 
he thinks there can be essence only of substances, or whether there also is essence of 
things of other categories, such as relations, accidents or places. In the logical works 
definition of the essence seems to play the role of guaranteeing scientific procedure, 
when it explains the non-accidental connection between the genus and the differentia. But 
it is not clear that the essence is of substance as the examples given are of thunder and 
eclipse, neither of which can easily be conceived as a substance. However, it may be so 
that Aristotle sums his thoughts up in the Metaphysics when he claims that there may be 
essence of whatever there is definition, so that it is the definition that becomes the 
hallmark of the essence. Our question concerns the essence of human dignity, and 
whether its definition as the fundamental value of the human being would be acceptable 
to Aristotle. We thus have a proposed definition – the question is what Aristotle would 
make of it and what he would understand by a fundamental value. 
 
Aristotle has the concept of value, as can be seen from the fact that economics traces its 
roots back to certain passages in the Ethics and Politics. He also has the concept of a 
fundamental principle, and it so happens that the words used to designate both realities 
are linguistically related to each other and to the expression ‘human dignity’: axia and 
axioma are translated into Latin by ‘dignus’ and ‘dignitas’. Axioma, which we have in 
‘axiom’, is like dignity in that it is of consequence, i.e. has things following from it, just 
like values have; both lay claims to appropriate responses, to having certain consequences 
recognised. A fundamental value, for Aristotle, is thus quite likely a principle, i.e. a 
normative reality from which everything else follows, or as he says about first principles, 
‘which must be accepted before the educational process can start’. As essence is also 
understood, like form, to be an explanatory principle (arche) of substance, it cannot be 
excluded that dignity is a substance, as substance in some instances is identified with 
essence. In this manner it could not be excluded that human dignity would be a principle, 
which could have a definition, and indeed the definition proposed. ‘Human’ would thus 
qualify the principle in question to apply to all human beings, attributing to them 
fundamental value. In this manner Aristotle could be seen to accept the proposed 
definition. 
 
Could Aquinas, a prominent representative of the Christian context, accept the proposed 
definition? He could conceive of the essence of human dignity to be an essence of a 
logical notion, like genus and species, which he considers to be ‘relations, accomplished 
by the reasoning mind, to essence as it exists in the mind’. That could make human 
dignity an accident of the mind, part of the essence of which is its attributability and its 
being accomplished by the mind in relation to the essence of the human being, as it exists 
in the mind. What the mind thus seems to accomplish is a relation between human beings, 
the mind conceptualising, and priority or dignity as such. Although human dignity then 
would be defined as an incidental property of the mind conceptualising it, it would as a 
concept apply to real human beings as such, attributing to them the priority that is dignity. 
What thus would be conceptually accomplished (incidentally) would be an essential 
attribute. 
 
Although the idea of the image of God is not restricted specifically to human beings in 
Aquinas (as it is implicitly in many other Christian thinkers), it is clear that there is a 
certain parallel between the two ideas. One could see the idea of the image, referring back 
beyond itself to the absolute authority and substantiality of God, as mediating a 
commitment in faith to recognise human dignity, i.e. to have or to institute the incidental 
property of the mind, attributing priority to the essence of human beings as it exists in the 
mind. The idea of the human being being created in the image of God thus encourages the 
acceptance of what looks very like the fundamental value of the human being, investing 
the human being with a claim for respect due to God, and to the human being because of 
God. It makes sense to call this incidental property a value because it motivates, and to 
call it fundamental because it is founded on nothing else but God’s authority, which it 
expresses. That it is attributed to the essence of the human being as it exists in the mind 
explains its universality. Aquinas, as a representative of Christian thought, could 
therefore also accept the definition proposed. 
 
Could Kant as a representative of the modern context? To Kant a value would be a 
noumenal reality attributed to empirical reality by an act of judgement. Like virtue, 
human dignity would be simultaneously logic and real so that we are doomed to have a 
provisional idea of it, given our insufficient understanding of the human being on which 
its understanding depends. Like the entire subject matter of the Metaphysics of Morals 
the understanding of virtue is empirically mediated (taking human nature into account), 
but founded apriori. This is also the case for the founding principle of the metaphysics of 
morals, human dignity, and thus its ‘transcendental location’ as either a noumenal or an 
empirical reality is problematic. The reason for this is profound: That the transcendental I 
necessarily understands itself as simple allows for only empirical facts, such as the 
human being, to distinguish subjects from one another. A judgement seems to subsume 
such empirical human beings under the concept of an end in itself despite Kant’s 
insistence that the ideas have no use within the empirical sphere. The power of judgement 
hence would determine the determinability of empirical human beings as ends in 
themselves, whereas reason would affirm the categorical imperative on this foundation. 
Human dignity could thus well be seen as an intentional object with its own logical, as 
distinct from real, essence, founded on human nature as it exists empirically in human 
beings. It could also be said to structure the personality of the one who adopts it to be the 
object of his or her will, thus acting in accordance with duty. It seems thus that Kant also, 
like Aristotle and Aquinas, could accept the definition proposed. 
  
3. A phenomenological explanation of what it means that human dignity is the 
fundamental value of the human being. 
 
If we thus can say, without coming into conflict with contexts other than the 
contemporary one, that human dignity is the fundamental value of the human being, what 
are we to understand by this definition, what does it mean?  
 
The human being as such motivates us, although it seems, to varying degrees. In war 
situations, and in particular in genocides, when respect for the human being as such is at 
its lowest, it shocks us to see how little the human being can mean to others of our kind. 
But then we are precisely that, shocked. We react as if something is amiss when faced 
with such disrespect for human beings. Why is that? It seems to be impossible for us to 
accept that human beings could be, without it being wrong, treated as if they were not 
human beings. 
 
This is because our whole experience is built up around the normal interchangability of 
perspectives between the I and the other I, which establishes intersubjectivity and makes 
language possible, and because we have learnt to understand ourselves as human beings 
first and foremost, i.e. learnt to identify ourselves with the type of the human being in its 
various components (I, person, zero point of orientation, sensitive body of a recognisable 
structure, psyche and soul). 
 
The I, in fact, I cannot regard as less important (as having less value) than any other 
element in my experience, because it always accompanies this experience, which would 
thus not be experienced were it not for the I. I, in other words, cannot experience 
anything without the I, and must consequently value it as highly as or as higher than, 
anything else I can experience, since it is indispensable to this experience. My person, 
being the subject of valuation as I experience it, I cannot value any less than the I, as it is 
by means of it that I experience valuation in the first place.  
 The other I, whom I identify in empathy, and whose experience together with mine 
contribute to my experience of objectivity, I cannot value any less than I value 
objectivity. In so far as I experience an I to be indispensable to its own experience, I also 
experience objectivity to rely on the indispensability of this perspective, which is 
different from mine. In this sense I must value the indispensability of the other I higher 
than objectivity, as it underlies it. Likewise with the other person, indispensable to the 
other’s motivated constitution of the world.  
 
I must value the type of the human being as highly as objectivity as it is the marker that 
allows for the interchangibility of perspectives. In this way the other human being is 
indispensable in the same way as I am indispensable to experience, and I am a human 
being, who, as such and in the world, is the source of subjective creativity. My body and 
the body of the other along with the psyche of us both must be as valuable as the type of 
the human being since it is these elements along with the I and the person that allow us to 
identify each other as of this type. 
 
It thus turns out that all the elements pertaining essentially to the human being are at least 
as valuable to us as objectivity, and as that includes everything in the world, the human 
being must be more valuable to us than the whole world, given that it co-originates its 
constitution. It is for this reason that we feel the whole world disturbed by disregard for 
the human being: it turns the world upside down and institutes chaos in our perception of 
the world. That human dignity should be respected means that the human being has 
importance for everything, that it has fundamental value, value that cannot be 
subordinated to any other value without it being wrong and affecting the meaningfulness 
of the world. Affirming human dignity means that we affirm that human beings have this 
fundamental value, and hence that we think this value should be placed higher than any 
other value, that it is indeed fundamental. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Having surveyed the textual evidence for the occurrence of the expression ‘human 
dignity’ and linguistically related expressions, we found human dignity placed in four 
different contexts, often providing the idea with ‘a foundation’. As the idea, however, 
must make sense in itself, since we can understand it despite the change of contexts, we 
attempted to see whether it was possible to understand human dignity as the fundamental 
value of the human being irrespective of context, and we found that it was. Finally a 
constitutional analysis of human dignity explained for us why we conceive of the 
fundamental value of the human being with quasi necessity given human experience. It is 
insight into this quasi necessity that makes us affirm that human dignity in fact is the 
fundamental value of the human being. 
 
 
 
 
